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Ted Stein was one of my most brilliant students at Harvard some ten
years ago, and in his last year there I asked him to assist me in the
preparation of my Hague lectures on the settlement of disputes relating to
the interpretation and application of treaties. His special assignment was to
check almost 5,000 treaties registered with the League of Nations, to find
all the clauses on the settlement of disputes, and to provide a methodology
for their classification and analysis. He prepared an excellent file of the
relevant clauses with an elaborate retrieval system for each important
element as well as thoughtful memoranda on the critical issues. 1 There-
after, I followed with great interest his career in the Department of State and
later in academia and, as I expected, he fufilled his early promise of
becoming a scholar able to throw light on a wide range of topics. As his last
contribution before his untimely death related to the formation and applica-
tion of an important principle of customary international law,2 I thought it
appropriate to continue his research by discussing a related area mentioned
in his paper. 3
It is universally agreed that "usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law' 4 constitute one of the main sources of international law.5
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate how a rule becomes "generally
accepted" as a part of customary international law. There are several
different ways in which international law deals with this subject. Or-
dinarily, a rule is considered generally accepted when it is supported by
constant practice of states acting on the conviction that the practice is
obligatory.6 Alternatively, an international agreement sometimes incorpo-
*Woodruff Professorof International Law, School of Law, University of Georgia; Bemis Professor of
International Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
1. See Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and Application of Treaties, in
150 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEL DES Cou s 273, n. 1 (1976).
2. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in
International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457 (1985).
3. See id. at 472, 476 ("generally applicable international law"; "generally applicable rule of
customary international law").
4. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (Judgment of September7), cited by
Stein, supra note 2, at 459, n.5.
5. In a similiar spirit, the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice,
art. 38, para. lb. For text of the Court's statute, see Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat.
1055; T.S. 993.
6. See J. L. BIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE 61 (C. Waldock 6th ed. 1963) (the existence of an international custom is established by "a
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rates certain rules as ones considered to be generally accepted; 7 or an
agreement is considered as declaratory of certain generally accepted rules
binding on all states. 8 In addition, international agreements may also
provide that rules to be adopted by an international organization shall be
considered as generally accepted (unless a state expressly opts out). 9
Occasionally, an international agreement that is not yet in force may
become binding on all states because of its adoption by a consensus,
signifying its general acceptance. 10 Finally, a resolution of an international
organization, adopted by consensus, or a nearly unanimous decision, may
declare that a rule has become generally accepted."
One of the major elements determining the obligatory character of a
particular rule of customary international law is its generality. As Brierly
once noted, "what is sought for is a general recognition among states of a
certain practice as obligatory." 12 It is not clear how generally accepted the
practice of the states must be, but "universality is not required." 13 Two
main factors need to be taken into account: first, express acceptance of the
rule by a reasonable number of states belonging to various regional groups
and representing different political, economic and ideological approaches;
second, aquiescence by other states. 14 The fact that a few states object to the
establishment of a new rule or to a revision of an old one does not prevent
the birth of the rule. At most, a persistent objector-as discussed by Ted
Stein15-is not bound by the rule; that state cannot, however, prevent the
emergence of the rule binding all non-objecting states.
In some cases, the general acceptance of a rule is strengthened by its
endorsement by a multinational treaty. In particular, several recent instru-
ments declare certain "generally accepted international rules" or "stan-
dards" or "regulations" as binding upon parties to these instruments, or as
general recognition among states of a certain practice as obligatory").
7. For instance, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas states in its preamble that its provisions are
"generally declaratory of established principles of international law." Convention on the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.S. 2312. 2314. T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 82.
8. See President Reagan's statement, infra note 31.
9. See T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
76-85 (1969); Gutteridge, Notes on Decisions of the World Health Organization, in THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 277-84 (S. Schwebel ed. 1971).
10. See decisions cited in Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Developments.
34 AM,. U. L. REV. 271, 276-79 (1985).
11. See Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 33-35 (1965). See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAWV 14-15, 14 n.5 (3d ed. 1979).
12. Supra note 6.
13. 1. BRONVNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 1979)
14. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum et al. v. Libyan Arab Republic, International Arbitral Tribunal,
17 I.L.M. 1, 27-31 (1978).
15. Stein, supra note 2, 458.
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establishing the norms which parties are entitled to apply to other parties. 16
Thus, parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
agreed that "[floreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea shall comply with. . . all generally accepted
international regulations relating to the prevention of collision at sea," even
if the flag states of these ships did not ratify the convention to which those
regulations are annexed. This method of incorporation by reference dis-
penses with the ratification of the documents referred to in the basic
convention and broadens the circle of states to which these documents
apply. A state's consent to these documents is not absent; it is given
indirectly by accepting the new convention.
Some international instruments dealing with matters of a highly tech-
nical nature, which need to be frequently amended because of new tech-
nological or scientific developments, provide for changes by an interna-
tional organization which become binding on parties to the basic
convention at a specified date, except for those states which notify the
organization before this date that they cannot accept the new regulations in
whole or in part. All states that keep silent become bound, without any
further action on their part. 17 These rules thus become generally accepted,
without need for specific ratification by any party to the basic convention.
The consent is thus given in advance, subject to the right to opt out.
Sometimes an international convention proclaims that it is declaratory of
preexisting rules of international law. If there is general consensus that such
a statement is not self-serving, but reflects the fact that the convention
codifies prior practice, making the rules clearer and more precise, the rules
contained in that convention are then considered as binding not only on
states that are parties to these conventions but also on all other states. Thus,
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas specifies in its preamble that its
16. See e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 21, paras. 2 and
4; art. 39, paras. 2a and b; art. 41, para. 3; art. 58, para. 3; art. 60, paras. 3, 5 and 6; art. 94, paras. 2a
and 5; art. 211, paras. 2,5 and 6c; and art. 236, par. Ia. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982); 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 12, 37, 38, 90, 61
Stat. 1180; T.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. Concerning the implementation of these articles see 9 M.
WHITFMAN, DiGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 12 (1968). See also T. BuERGErrHAL, LAw-MAKING IN
ThE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 57-85 (1969). For a recent example of this kind of a
provision, see Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980
T.I.A.S. No. 10240, which in article IX(6) provides that conservation measures adopted by the
commission become binding upon all parties 180 days after notification, except that, if a Member of the
Commission, within 90 days after notification, "notifies the Commission that is is unable to accept the




provisions are "generally declaratory of established principles of interna-
tional law."' 18 Even without such a declaratory statement, some interna-
tional treaties, or at least certain of their basic provisions, have been
accepted as generally binding formulations of customary international law.
Thus, the basic obligations under the Charter of the United Nations-to
settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force-have been accepted not only
by states members of the United Nations, but have been relied upon also by
non-member states, or have been imposed upon them. 19 In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases,20 the International Court of Justice held that
several articles of the Convention on the Continental Shelf were regarded as
"reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of
customary international law." 2 1
Once this had been accepted, it proved relatively easy for the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to hold that a rule that is conventional in origin can
pass into the general corpus of international law and be accepted as such by
the opiniojuris and thus "become binding even for countries which have
never, and do not, become parties to the Convention." 22 The court added
that this "constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new
rules of customary international law may be formed." 23
The issue then had to be considered whether one needs to wait for the
treaty to come into force in order for its customary law to become binding.
That issue first arose with respect to the Convention of the Law of Treaties,
which was adopted in 1969 but came into force only in 1980.24 The
International Court of Justice already in 1971 found it possible to declare
that the rules laid down in that convention "concerning termination of a
treaty relationship on account of breach (adopted without a dissenting vote)
18. See supra note 7.
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 3 and 4. For text of the Charter, see 59 Stat. 103 1, T.S. 993. The
Charter also contains the "revolutionary" provision that the United Nations shall ensure that states
which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be
neccesary for the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6. See
Comment, Revolutionar
" 
Creation of Norms ofInternational Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 123-26
(1947)
20. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 39 (Judgment of Feb.
28).
21. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471; T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 49
U.N.T.S. 311.
22. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 41.
23. Id. For an excellent description of the process of "coalescence" through which a genuine
comunis opinio jris has come into being in this instance, see North Sea Continental Shelf. 1969
I.C.J. 3, 156-58 (Vice President Koretsky, dissenting).
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27,
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
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may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary
law on the subject." '25
The Court had to face the issue twice in connection with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 26 In a case decided at the
beginning of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, at
which this convention was drafted, the Court stated that it was premature to
examine the proposals submitted to that conference, as they "must be
regarded as manifestations of the views and opinions of individual States
and as vehicles of their aspirations, rather than as expressing principles of
existing law"; the Court added that it cannot "anticipate the law before the
legislator has laid it down." 27 In a later case, however, when the drafting of
the convention was far advanced but when the convention was not yet
signed, the Court stated that, even if the parties had not asked it (in the
special agreement submitting the case to the Court) to base its decision in
part on "the new accepted trends in the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea," it would have taken proprio moto account of the
progress made by the conference. 28 The Court explained that "it could not
ignore any provision of the draft convention if it came to the conclusion that
the content of such provision is binding upon all members of the interna-
tional community because it embodies or crystallizes a pre-existing or
emergent rule of customary law. "29
The Court is thus willing to pay attention not only to a text that codifies
preexisting principles of international law but also to one that crystallizes
an "emergent rule of customary law." It seems, therefore, that once a
principle is generally accepted at an international conference, usually
through consensus, 30 a rule of customary international law can emerge
without having to wait for the signature of the convention. The fact,
however, of the convention signature by a large number of states31 confirms
25. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (Advisory
opinion of June 21).
26. Supra note 16.
27. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 23-24 (Judgment of July 25).
28. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 38 (Judgment of Feb. 24).
29. Id. at 38.
30. According to Article 161(8)(e) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
"consensus" means the absence of any formal objection. See supra note 16.
31. For instance, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed by 159 states.
Although the United States did not sign the convention because of its opposition to provisions relating to
deep seabed mining, President Reagan announced on March 10, 1983, that the United States accepts
other provisions of the convention "which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and
fairly balance the interests of all states." U.S. Oceans Policy: Statement by the President, 83 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2075, at 70 (1983).
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that the provisions of the convention have been generally accepted by the
overwhelming majority of the members of the international community,
and constitutes clear evidence that there is an opinio juris that these
provisions are generally acceptable, and that indeed they have been gener-
ally accepted. Later ratification of the convention by many states further
confirms this fact of general acceptance not only of the general principles of
the convention but also of all its detailed provisions designed to implement
these principles.
Apart from drafting multilateral law-making conventions, international
organizations in recent years have developed other methods for updating
customary international law. In particular, the United Nations-in the
General Assembly of which practically all the states of the world are now
represented-can supplement the treaty-making process by adopting de-
claratory resolutions which, if accepted by an overwhelming majority of
the General Assembly, usually by consensus or by an almost unanimous
vote, can also constitute "generally accepted" principles of international
law. In this way the General Assembly has been able to adopt basic
international instruments on human rights, 32 to elaborate the basic princi-
ples which govern relations between states, 33 to define agression, 34 to
develop the rules governing the exploration and use of outer space, 35 to
confirm the rules for the protection of the environment, 36 and to establish
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217(A), 3 U.N. GAOR Res., at 71-77,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). It was implemented by the two International Covenants on Human Rights and
some fifty other instruments. Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, U.N. Sales
Pub. No. E.83.XIV.1 (1983). As the Court of Justice of the European Communities has stated,
"fundamental human rights form an integral part of the principles of law, the observance of which [the
Court] ensures," using as guidelines "international treaties for the protection of human rights on which
the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories." J. Nohl, Kohlen-und
Baustoffengrosshandlung v. Commission of European Communities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491,
507 (Judgement of May 14).
33. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). It contains a far-reaching implementation of
the fundamental principles embodied in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which
impose upon all states the following duties: to refrain from the threat or use of force, to settle their
international disputes by peaceful means, to co-operate with one another, to promote the realization of
equal rights and self determination of people, to respect the principle of sovereign equality, and to fulfil
in good faith the obligations assumed by them under the Charter.
34. Definition of Agression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
35. Declaration of Legal Principals Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
36. Declaration on the Human Environemnt, in REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES ON
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.48/14 at 2-5 (1972), noted with satisfaction in G.
A. Res. 2994, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). Concerning the law-
making character of this declaration, see Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973)
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institutions for promoting international trade between the developed and
the developing countries. 37 All these documents have by now been gener-
ally accepted even if at their birth there have been some doubts about their
normative character. 38 Frequently, states which were originally reluctant to
accept these instruments have later become their most vociferous support-
ers, relying strongly on these instruments in condemning their violations
by other states.39 Consequently, as the Secretariat of the United Nations
explained, a declaration "may be considered to impart . . . a strong
expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it,"
and "in so far as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a
declaration' may by custom become recognized as laying down rules
binding upon States" 40 The general rule, of course, applies to all such
declarations: to become binding they must be generally accepted as legally
binding by the members of the international community, either at the time
of their adoption or by subsequent practice of a reasonable number of
states, evidencing their willingness to conform to the principles contained
in a declaration and by general acquiescence by other states.
It has been noted in this paper that the methods of developing new rules
of customary international law have greatly changed since the Second
World War. These changes have not been imposed on states by any external
authority; they are the result of a voluntary acceptance by states of the need
to adapt the methods of law-creation to the needs of the rapidly growing and
changing world community. Any prior restrictions on the law-creating
process were self-made, and they can be changed by the very method that
established them in the first place. The rules contained in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice4' were appropriate at the time
of their adoption, and they are flexible enough to allow new ways of
ascertainment of the existence of a rule of customary international law.
States are free to decide at any time, by the same method by which
customary law is made, i.e., by "general practice accepted as law," that the
37. Establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as an Organ of the
GeneralAssembly, G.A. Res. 1995,19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1965). One
of the principal duties of this United Nations organ is to "formulate principles and policies on
international trade and related problems of economic development." Id., para. II.3(b). See, e.g., Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices,
35 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 61(c)) U.N. Doc. A/C.2/35/6 (1980), adopted by G.A. Res.
35/63, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980)).
38. See, e.g., Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTs: EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF PEACE, 39, 67-71 (1968).
39. See, Sohn, The Shaping ofInternational Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 19-20 (1978)
40. Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.6 10, para.
4, (quoted in 34 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/3614/Rev.l (1962)).
41. Supra note 5.
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methods of formulating new rules of law which were developed in recent
years are legitimate methods of law-creation. There is no rule of interna-
tional law preventing all states meeting in a conference, or an assembly of
an international organization, to agree that henceforth they will use certain
methods of law-creation and will consider themselves bound by the rules
established through that method. In fact, as shown above, they have
actually done this very thing explicitly in several instances, and it is quite
likely that the use of such new methods will increase in the future.
In his article cited above, Ted Stein has noted this "great change in the
dominant mode of identifying generally binding rules of international
law." 42 His article was devoted to finding a way to accommodate the lone
"persistent objector," who either does not like a new method or a new rule
elaborated through such method. He was right that the easier it becomes to
develop new principles and rules of international law, the more a safety
valve is needed to safeguard national sovereignty and vital state interests. A
state needing time to adapt to a new situation can obtain temporary
dispensation from a new rule by lodging its objections and explaining the
reasons for them. Later, by "mutual accommodation, reasonableness and
cooperation," 43 a solution can be found to enable the state concerned to
submit to the rule, if necessary, with some generally acceptable modifica-
tions. Ex concordia jus oritur.
42. Stein, supra note 2, at 464.
43. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 at 23.
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